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Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:
A Tutorial
Miqdad Asaria, MSc, Susan Griffin, PhD, Richard Cookson, PhD
Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA) is
a framework for incorporating health inequality concerns
into the economic evaluation of health sector interven-
tions. In this tutorial, we describe the technical details of
how to conduct DCEA, using an illustrative example com-
paring alternative ways of implementing the National
Health Service (NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Programme
(BCSP). The 2 key stages in DCEA are 1) modeling social
distributions of health associated with different interven-
tions, and 2) evaluating social distributions of health with
respect to the dual objectives of improving total population
health and reducing unfair health inequality. As well as
describing the technical methods used, we also identify
the data requirements and the social value judgments
that have to be made. Finally, we demonstrate the use of
sensitivity analyses to explore the impacts of alternative
modeling assumptions and social value judgments. Key
words: cost-effectiveness analysis; economic evaluation;
efficiency; equality; equity; fairness; health distribution;
health inequality; inequality measures; opportunity cost;
social value judgments; social welfare functions; tradeoff.
(Med Decis Making 2016;36:8–19)
INTRODUCTION
When designing and prioritizing interventions,
health care decision makers often have concerns
about reducing unfair health inequality as well as
improving total population health. However, the eco-
nomic evaluationof such interventions is typically con-
ducted using methods of cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA), which focus exclusively on maximizing total
population health. These standard methods of CEA
donot provide decisionmakerswith information about
the health inequality impacts of the interventions eval-
uated, or the nature and size of any tradeoffs between
improving total population health and reducing unfair
health inequality.
To address these shortcomings, we have devel-
oped a framework for incorporating health inequality
impacts into CEA, which we call distributional
cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA).1DCEA is suitable
for health sector decisions concerning the design
and prioritization of any type of health care interven-
tion with an explicit health inequality reduction
objective—potentially including treatments as well
as preventive health care such as programs of health
promotion, screening, vaccination, case finding, pri-
mary and secondary prevention of chronic disease,
and so on. However, like standard CEA, it focuses
exclusively on health benefits and opportunity costs
falling on the health sector budget. DCEA therefore
does not provide a fully general framework of distri-
butional economic evaluation for the health and
income inequality impacts of cross-government pub-
lic health programs with important nonhealth bene-
fits and opportunity costs falling outside the health
sector budget.
TheDCEA framework has 2main stages: 1)model-
ing social distributions of health associated with
each intervention, and 2) evaluating social
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distributions of health. Themain steps in the model-
ing stage are
1a. estimating the baseline health distribution;
1b.modeling changes to this baseline distribution due to
the health interventions being compared, allowing
for the distribution of opportunity costs from addi-
tional resource use; and
1c. adjusting the resulting modeled health distributions
for alternative social value judgments about fair and
unfair sources of health variation.
And the main steps in the evaluation stage are
2a. using the estimated distributions to quantify the
change in total population health and unfair health
inequality due to each intervention;
2b. ranking the interventions based on dominance crite-
ria; and, finally,
2c. analyzing any tradeoffs between improving popula-
tion health and reducing unfair health inequality,
allowing for alternative specifications of the under-
lying social welfare function.
We have previously applied the DCEA framework
to analyze 4 possible options for promoting
increased uptake of the National Health Service
(NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP)
in England.2 In this tutorial, we work through this
applied example to describe the key steps in con-
ducting a DCEA.
The BCSP is a biennial self-test-based screening
program targeted at 60–74 year olds that aims to
detect and treat colorectal cancer (CRC) early, and it
has been shown to reduce CRC-related mortality
risk by a substantial proportion. Individuals in the
relevant age range are sent a guaiac fecal occult blood
test (gFOBT) kit in the mail and are expected to com-
plete the test by collecting 3 stool samples during
a period of a few days and post them back for labora-
tory analysis. Those individuals testing positive are
invited for further diagnostic testing (follow-up colo-
noscopy) and, when appropriate, treatment.
Analysis of the BCSP pilots and early data from the
rollout of the BCSP have indicated large variations
in uptake of the screening program patterned by
the social variables of area deprivation, sex, and eth-
nicity. This variation in uptake can be modeled to
estimate its impact on mortality and morbidity for
the different socioeconomic subgroups in the popu-
lation, and hence to describe the impact of the
screening program on both the average level of
health and the social distribution of health in the
population.
METHODS
Stage A: Modeling Social Distributions of Health
Estimating the baseline health distribution
The first step in DCEA is to describe the baseline
distribution of health, taking into account variation
in both length and health-related quality of life.
This baseline distribution will need to include the
full general population, and not just the population
of recipients of the intervention. This is for 2 reasons.
First, the full general population is typically the rele-
vant population for characterizing policy concerns
with health inequality. Second, within the context
of a national, budget-constrained system such as the
NHS, additional resources used by recipients of an
intervention will displace activities that could have
been provided to anyone within the full general
population.
This baseline distribution of health should be able
to describe variation in health amongmultiple differ-
ent subgroups in the population as defined by
relevant population characteristics, allowing for
the correlation structure among these various charac-
teristics. The relevant population characteristics
include not only dimensions of direct equity concern
(e.g., income and ethnicity) but also characteristics
that are necessary to estimate expected costs and
effects and that may generate further equity concern
(e.g., sex). The latter of these is standard for any
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), whereas the former
we discuss further throughout this tutorial. The
health metric we use in this context is quality-
adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth, although
other suitable health metrics could also be used—
such as disability-adjusted life expectancy at birth
or age-specific QALE—as long as they are measured
on an interpersonally comparable ratio scale suitable
for use within a CEA.
The population characteristics of interest in this
case study—those by which a substantial variation
in uptake of the BCSP was observed—are sex, area-
level deprivation, and area-level ethnic diversity.
The first step in estimating our population QALE dis-
tribution is to estimate life expectancy (LE), accord-
ing to each of these characteristics. Area-level
deprivation in the BCSP evaluation studies was mea-
sured based on index of multiple deprivation (IMD
2004) quintile groups, and area-level ethnic diversity
was based on the percentage of people in the area
originating from the Indian Subcontinent, again split
into quintile groups.3 National statistics data are
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available by sex and deprivation level/social class,
but are not available by our particular measure of eth-
nic diversity. We therefore did not include correla-
tions with ethnic diversity in our estimation of the
baseline health distribution and instead, for the pur-
poses of the analysis, assumed its distribution is
independent of deprivation and sex.
A full description of how the baseline health distri-
bution was calculated can be found in the appendix.
A summary of this QALE distribution by health quin-
tile is shown in Figure 1. This forms the baseline
health distribution that we will use in our analysis.
Estimating the distribution of health changes due
to the interventions
To evaluate changes in the baseline health distri-
bution that could be attributed to the use of alterna-
tive interventions, it is necessary to know how the
costs and effects of the intervention differ between
the relevant subgroups, and how the opportunity
costs of any change in resource use differ by those
same subgroups.
Having estimated a baseline health distribution,
wenext turn tomodeling how this health distribution
is affected by the BCSP and alternative ways of pro-
moting increased uptake of the BCSP. We do this by
using an existing cost-effectiveness model of the
BCSP that simulates the natural history of CRC and
the impact of screening and treatment on this natural
history.4,5 We adapt the model to look at the dis-
tributional health impacts of 4 different screening
strategies:
1. No screening: the baseline social distribution of
health
2. Standard screening: as implemented in the BCSP
3. Targeted reminder: screening plus a targeted
enhanced reminder letter (personal general practi-
tioner [GP] signed letter and tailored information
package) sent only to those living in the most
income-deprived small areas (IMD4 and IMD5) as
well as to those living in areas with the highest pro-
portion of inhabitants from the Indian Subcontinent
(IS5)
4. Universal reminder: screening plus a universal basic
reminder letter (sending a GP-endorsed reminder let-
ter to all eligible patients)
Impacts are first estimated by subgroup and then
combined to evaluate the impact of the screening
strategies on the overall social distribution of health.
There are a number of parameters in themodel that
can vary by subgroup, including:
1. Disease prevalence, severity, mortality rate, and nat-
ural history: We assume in our case study that bowel
cancer–specific parameters are constant across our
population subgroups. The evidence available6
broadly supports this assumption, although more
detailed data at the subgroup level would be required
to validate this assumption.
2. Uptake of the intervention: The impact of gFOBT
uptake by subgroup is the key difference between
the various implementations of the screening pro-
gram. We discuss in detail in this article how this
parameter is estimated for each subgroup. We also
estimate the uptake of follow-up colonoscopy by sub-
group for those people who are invited back for fur-
ther investigation after being screened.
3. Direct costs associated with the intervention: We
assume the direct costs related to treating a given
stage of bowel cancer do not vary by subgroup
(although the chance of incurring these costs and
the screening-related costs by subgroup may vary
under the different implementations of the screening
program). This seems to be a plausible assumption in
the absence ofmore detailed cost data at the subgroup
level.
4. Opportunity costs from displaced activities: Oppor-
tunity costs are in the base case analysis assumed to
be shared equally among all population subgroups;
this assumption is explored in sensitivity analyses
discussed later in this tutorial.
5. Other-cause mortality: We use the mortality rates by
subgroup in the same way as discussed when deriv-
ing the baseline health distribution. In calculating
these rates, we remove bowel cancer–specific mortal-
ity (assuming this is constant across subgroups) and
apply this separately in the model.
Quality adjustment of health gains to reflect morbid-
ity: We apply the subgroup-specific adjustments to
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Figure 1 Baseline health distribution.
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quality-adjust health gains resulting from the screen-
ing program in a similar manner to that applied to
estimate the baseline health distribution. The popu-
lation QALE distribution under no screening corre-
sponds to our baseline health distribution as
calculated in the previous section. In our analysis
of the BCSP, we include an additional variable—
area-level proportion of population from the Indian
Subcontinent (IS)—which we were unable to incor-
porate into our estimation of the baseline health dis-
tribution. We assume that this IS variable is
distributed independently of IMD and sex, and
that it has no independent effect on baseline QALE
(i.e., subgroups are adjusted for other-cause mortal-
ity and quality adjusted only according to their
IMD and sex, and these adjustments are not affected
by their IS status). We next adjust the BCSP uptake
parameters by subgroup. Table 1 shows logistic
regression results looking at gFOBT uptake in the 3
rounds of the BCSP pilot.3We use these data in com-
bination with the proportion of invitees in each cat-
egory by variable, also reported in the pilot
evaluation, to get weighted average odds ratios
(ORs) for uptake that can be applied in the model.
These ORs are applied to a baseline rate of uptake
reported in the third-round pilot, in which males in
the youngest age group, living in the most deprived
areas and with the highest proportion of people
from the Indian Subcontinent, had an uptake proba-
bility of 34%. For example, to calculate the uptake
probability for a woman of any age across all rounds
of the pilot, living in the least deprived areas and
with the least numbers of people from the Indian Sub-
continent, we can use the following calculation:
OR5 0:34= 1 0:34ð Þ  1:38=0:82ð Þ  1:13  0:86
1=0:37ð Þ  1=0:86ð Þ5 2:71
P5OR= 11ORð Þ5 0:73
A similar regression analysis was reported analyzing
the effect of these same variables on the uptake of fol-
low-up colonoscopy. Data were also published in the
pilot study evaluation regarding the numbers of peo-
ple in each category for each variable in the study.
However, cross-tabulations or correlations between
the variables were not available, and we therefore
assumed that each variable was independently dis-
tributed to calculate the proportion of the population
in each subgroup. Table 2 shows our calculated
gFOBT uptake, the follow-up colonoscopy uptake,
and the proportion of the population by each
subgroup.
Using these parameters in the model provides the
total costs and health gains due to the BCSP under
the standard screening approach.
We next turn to modeling the remaining 2
implementations of the screening program. Both
implementations augment the standard screening
program with additional reminders. We derive the
indicative estimates of costs and impacts on screen-
ing uptake of these reminder strategies from similar
interventions studied in the screening literature,7,8
applying plausible exchange rates and inflation rates
to the figures to get costs, and assuming all subgroups
receiving the interventions have equal additive
increases in uptake. The values used in the model
for costs and impacts on gFOBT uptake for each of
the strategies are given in Table 3.
To estimate total costs and health effects, the
model is evaluated for a representative cohort of the
population—in our case, a cohort of 1 million 30
Table 1 Regression Results of gFOBT Uptake
from Evaluation of BCSP Pilot
Adjusted OR
(95% CI)
Age (years) 57–59 1
60–64 1.13
(1.11–1.16)
65–69 1.25
(1.22–1.28)
Sex Male 1
Female 1.38
(1.35–1.40)
Pilot round 1 1
2 0.77
(0.76–0.80)
3 0.82
(0.81–0.84)
Deprivation
category (IMD)
Q1 (Least
deprived)
1
Q2 0.84
(0.81–0.87)
Q3 0.70
(0.68–0.72)
Q4 0.55
(0.54–0.57)
Q5 (Most deprived) 0.37
(0.35–0.38)
% Indian Subcontinent Q1–4 1
Q5 (Highest %) 0.86
(0.84–0.89)
BCSP, National Health Service (NHS) Bowel Cancer Screening Pro-
gramme; CI, confidence interval; gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test;
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; OR, odds ratio.
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year olds, as was used in the original analysis of the
BCSP in themodelwe inherited. The size of each sub-
group is given by the population proportions calcu-
lated in Table 2. We sum the costs across all
subgroups, and convert these to health opportunity
costs using a threshold value of £20,000 per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY). These health opportunity
costs are then apportioned equally to each individual
in the population, allowing the model to characterize
net health gains in each subgroup. For example, the
total costs for the standard screening program during
the lifetime of the cohort of 1million patients came to
£72 million. Converting this to health opportunity
costs at the rate of £20,000 per QALY gives us 3600
QALYs of health opportunity costs. Women who
live in areas with a low percentage of the population
from the Indian Subcontinent (IS Q1–4), and who
also fall within deprivation quintile IMD Q3, make
up 10% of the population. So we allocate 10% of
this total health opportunity cost to them (i.e., 360
QALYs). This is then subtracted from the total health
gains due to the BCSP in this subgroup to give the net
health effect of the BCSP on this subgroup.
The assumption of equally distributed opportu-
nity costs is convenient but not evidence based. So
we explore alternative assumptions in sensitivity
analysis, focusing on 2 extreme cases in which all
opportunity costs are allocated to the least healthy
and the healthiest subgroups, respectively.
The additional parameters that we have added to
themodel are assigned standard distributions by vari-
able type, and their mean and standard error values
are used to generate suitable random draws for these
variables in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis
(PSA). Details of how these additional variables are
dealt with in the PSA are given in Table 4. All the
results presented are produced by running the model
probabilistically and averaging more than 1000 itera-
tions of the model.
The resulting health distributions estimated for
each screening implementation are described in Fig-
ures 2 and 3 and Table 5. Figure 2A shows the gFOBT
uptake byhealth quintile for each strategy, andFigure
2B shows the colonoscopy uptake by health quintile.
Table 2 gFOBT Uptake, Follow-Up Colonoscopy Uptake, and Proportion of Population by Subgroup
Sex
% Indian
Subcontinent
Deprivation
(IMD quintile)
gFOBT
Uptake (%)
Colonoscopy
Uptake (%)
Population
Proportion (%)
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 66 86 6
Q2 62 84 9
Q3 58 80 10
Q4 52 79 8
Q5 (Most deprived) 42 77 6
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 63 87 1
Q2 59 85 2
Q3 54 81 3
Q4 48 79 2
Q5 (Most deprived) 38 75 2
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 73 85 6
Q2 70 83 9
Q3 66 79 10
Q4 60 77 8
Q5 (Most deprived) 50 76 6
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 70 86 1
Q2 66 83 2
Q3 62 79 3
Q4 56 78 2
Q5 (Most deprived) 46 76 2
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test; IMD, index of multiple deprivation.
Table 3 Costs and Impact on gFOBT Uptake of
Reminder Strategies
Strategy
Cost per
Recipient
Increase in gFOBT
Uptake per Recipient
Universal reminder £3.50 6%
Targeted reminder £7.00 12%
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test.
ASARIA AND OTHERS
12  MEDICAL DECISION MAKING/JANUARY 2016
QALE for each subgroup calculated fromour adjusted
model is given in Table 5, and these are presented for
our cohort by health quintile in Figure 3A and Figure
3B, allowing us to better appreciate the relative
impacts of the strategies.
Adjusting for social value judgments about fair
and unfair sources of inequality
The distributions of health estimated thus far rep-
resent all variation in health in the population.
However, some variation in health may be deemed
‘‘fair,’’ or at least ‘‘not unfair,’’ perhaps because it is
due to individual choice or unavoidable bad luck.
In such cases, the health distributions should first
be adjusted to only include health variation deemed
‘‘unfair’’ before measuring the level of inequality.
Social value judgments need to be made about
whether health variation associated with each of the
population characteristics is deemed fair. In our
example, we have 3 variables to consider: sex, IMD,
Table 4 Distributions and Parameter Values Used in PSA for Additional Parameters Added to the Model
Parameter Explanation
gFOBT and colonoscopy uptake Uncertainty on these calculated in PSA assuming ln(OR) distributed normally. The
variance covariance matrices for the uptake regressions were not available to us, so we
drew each coefficient independently and combined to create uptake probabilities.
Mortality rates Adjusted for uncertainty by the underlying model.
Quality adjustment Used b distributionwith themean and standard error values as reported in the UKEQ-5D
norms.
Cost of reminders As no data were given on the uncertainty, we assume a 10% standard error and used this
to draw values from the appropriate g distributions.
Impact of reminders on uptake Reported mean and standard error values used to draw from the appropriate b
distributions.
gFOBT, guaiac fecal occult blood test; OR, odds ratio; PSA, probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Table 5 QALE Distribution by Subgroup Under Each Strategy
QALE
Sex % Indian Subcontinent Deprivation (IMD quintile) Baseline Standard Targeted Universal
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 72.16 72.21 72.20 72.21
Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.09 69.12 69.12 69.13
Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.22 60.24 60.24 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 72.16 72.20 72.21 72.21
Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.09 69.12 69.13 69.12
Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.22 60.23 60.24 60.23
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.91 74.92
Q2 73.10 73.16 73.16 73.17
Q3 71.77 71.82 71.81 71.82
Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.92 74.91
Q2 73.10 73.16 73.17 73.16
Q3 71.77 71.81 71.82 71.82
Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20
Overall average 69.260 69.300 69.301 69.302
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.
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and ethnicity. We might make the value judgment
that differences in health due to sex are fair, whereas
differences in health due to IMD and ethnicity are
unfair—this is 1 of 8 possible value judgments that
we can make on fairness in this example. One way
of adjusting our modeled health distributions for this
value judgment is by using direct standardization.9
To do this, we run a regression on our QALE distribu-
tion weighting the subgroups by the proportion of the
population they represent to find the association
between each variable and QALE. An example of
such a regression is given in Table 6. We then use ref-
erence values for those variables deemed fair (i.e., sex
in this case) while leaving the other variables to take
the values they have in the relevant subgroups and
predict out an adjusted QALE distribution. In this
example, we use male as the reference value for sex
and predict out the QALE distribution as shown in
Table 7. This distribution represents only the variation
in health deemed unfair by the social value judgment
made. Reference values used in the adjustment pro-
cess are typically population averages for continuous
variables, whereas for categorical variables the most
commonly occurring category is typically used with
sensitivity analysis performed on the impact of alter-
native choices of reference category.
Stage B: Evaluating Social Distributions of Health
Comparing interventions in terms of total health
and unfair health inequality
Once we have estimated the appropriate health
distributions, we can then go on to characterize the
distributions in terms of the twin policy goals of
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improving total health and reducing health inequal-
ity. One useful piece of information for decisionmak-
ers produced at this step of the analysis is the size of
the health opportunity cost of choosing an interven-
tion that reduces health inequality—this is simply
the difference in total health between the interven-
tion and a comparator. However, this step of the anal-
ysis can also go further than that by providing
information about the size of the reduction in health
inequality, in terms of the difference in 1 ormore suit-
able inequality indices between the intervention and
a comparator. The selection of appropriate inequality
indices requires further value judgments about the
nature of the inequality concern. There are a number
of commonly used indices to measure inequality that
can be broadly grouped into those measuring relative
inequality (scale-invariant indices), those measuring
absolute inequality (translation invariant), and those
measuring health poverty or shortfall froma reference
value. If there is no clear choice of inequality mea-
sure, it may be preferable to calculate a range of alter-
native measures.
Table 8 shows the results of calculating a range of
relative and absolute inequality measures for the
QALE distributions associated with our 4 screening
strategies. A higher value for each measure indicates
Table 6 Fairness Adjustment Regression
Coefficient
(SE)
Constant 74.92
(4.37E-05)
IS Q1–4 20.004
(2.56E-05)
Male 22.708
(5.47E-05)
IMD Q2 21.75
(4.91E-05)
IMD Q3 23.097
(4.84E-05)
IMD Q4 25.675
(5.02E-05)
IMD Q5 211.71
(5.33E-05)
Male*IMD Q2 0.065
(6.95E-05)
Male*IMD Q3 0.015
(6.84E-05)
Male*IMD Q4 0.104
(7.10E-05)
Male*IMD Q5 20.259
(7.532E-05)
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; IS, Indian Subcontinent; SE, stan-
dard error.
Table 7 Fairness Adjusted Health Distribution Reference Sex = Male
QALE
Sex % Indian Subcontinent Deprivation (IMD quintile) Targeted Targeted Adjusted
Male Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 72.20 72.20
Q2 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.12 69.12
Q4 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.24 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 72.21 72.21
Q2 70.52 70.52
Q3 69.13 69.13
Q4 66.63 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 60.24 60.24
Female Q1–4 Q1 (Least deprived) 74.91 72.20
Q2 73.16 70.52
Q3 71.81 69.12
Q4 69.24 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.20 60.24
Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least deprived) 74.92 72.21
Q2 73.17 70.52
Q3 71.82 69.13
Q4 69.24 66.63
Q5 (Most deprived) 63.20 60.24
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; QALE, quality-adjusted life expectancy.
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a higher level of inequality between the healthiest
and the least healthy.
Ranking interventions using dominance rules
The first step in comparing distributions is looking
to commonly used distributional dominance rules,
because these allow strategies to be ranked with min-
imal restriction to the form of the underlying social
welfare function. In terms of standard economic dom-
inance rules, we can note fromTable 5 that no screen-
ing and standard screening are strictly dominated in
the space of QALE by the universal reminder
strategy—that is, the no sex-IMD-ethnicity subgroup
is less healthy, and at least 1 subgroup is healthier.
However, this rule does not account for the level of
inequality. When ranking distributions based on
mean health and the level of health inequality, it is
possible to use alternative economic dominance rules
provided byAtkinson10 and Shorrocks.11These dom-
inance rules apply when mean health is higher and
inequality is lower for almost anymeasure of inequal-
ity. Both rules are based around the Lorenz curve,12
a tool to analyze relative inequality constructed for
health distributions by ordering the population
from least healthy to most healthy and plotting the
cumulative proportion of population health against
the cumulative proportion of the population. Regard-
ing Atkinson’s theorem tests for Lorenz dominance
between distributions, this means that the Lorenz
curves for the distributions do not cross, and the
more equal distribution has at least as much mean
health as the less equal distribution. In other words,
a distribution is dominated if it has higher inequality
and the same or lower amount of mean health. On
these criteria, the standard screening strategy is dom-
inated by the targeted reminder. Shorrocks’ theorem
tests for generalized Lorenz dominance, wherein
the Lorenz curve is multiplied by the mean health.
A distribution is dominated if the generalized Lorenz
curve lies wholly below that of an alternative inter-
vention. Under this criterion, both the targeted and
universal reminder strategies dominate the no-
screening option. This leaves us to compare the uni-
versal-reminder and targeted-reminder strategies.
Although the universal reminder produces a higher
average QALE overall and benefits the less deprived
quintile groups more, the targeted reminder is the
more equal strategy on every measure listed in Table
8 and benefits the most deprived quintile groups
more. In our example, the generalized Lorenz curves
for these 2 distributions cross, and hence we cannot
use Shorrocks’ theorem to rank the distributions.
Analyzing tradeoffs between total health and
health inequality using social welfare indices
Having used distributional dominance to elimi-
nate no screening and standard screening, to rank
the remaining 2 strategies it is necessary to specify
more fully an underlying social welfare function. A
number of alternative social welfare indices have
been proposed that could be used to characterize
the dual objectives of increasing total health and
reducing health inequality. A common feature of
such functions is the need to specify the nature of
Table 8 Inequality Measures Calculated for 4 Screening Strategies
Relative Inequality Indices No Screening Standard Targeted Reminder Universal Reminder
Relative gap index (ratio) 0.17527* 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596
Relative index of inequality 0.18607* 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678
Gini index 0.03101* 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113
Atkinson index (e = 1) 0.00171* 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172
Atkinson index (e = 7) 0.01330* 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338
Atkinson index (e = 30) 0.06253* 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283
Absolute Inequality Indices No Screening Standard Targeted Reminder Universal Reminder
Absolute gap index (range) 10.98604* 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325
Slope index of inequality 12.88747* 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438
Kolm index (a = 0.025) 0.20281* 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439
Kolm index (a = 0.1) 0.87801* 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467
Kolm index (a = 0.5) 4.56391* 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883
a = 0.025, low absolute inequality aversion; a = 0.5, high absolute inequality aversion; e = 1, low relative inequality aversion; e = 30, high relative inequality
aversion.
*The most equal strategy.
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and level (or value) of inequality aversion. The
inequality aversion parameters in these functions
describe the tradeoff between total health and the level
of health inequality (i.e., the amount of total health that
a decision maker would be willing to sacrifice to
achieve a more equal distribution). These inequality
aversion parameters are difficult to interpret on a raw
scale. A more intuitive scale can be provided by com-
bining a specific value of the parameter with a specific
health distribution to derive the equally distributed
equivalent (EDE) level of health. The difference
between the mean level of health in that distribution
and the EDE level of health then represents the average
amount of health per person that one would be willing
to sacrifice to achieve full equality in health, given that
specific value of inequality aversion.
In this example, we will use 2 social welfare indi-
ces closely linked to the dominance rules applied
above: the Atkinson index10 to evaluate the distribu-
tions in terms of relative inequality, and the Kolm
index13 to evaluate the distributions in terms of abso-
lute inequality. The EDE for these social welfare indi-
ces can be calculated as follows using the inequality
aversion parameters e and a, respectively:
Atkinson social welfare index:
hede5
1
n
Xn
i5 1
hi½ 
1e
" # 1
1e
Kolm social welfare index:
hede5 
1
a
 
log
1
n
Xn
i5 1
eahi
 !
Figure 4A and Figure 4B show the difference in EDE
health between the 2 strategies across different levels
of inequality aversion for the relative and absolute
social welfare indices, respectively. With zero
inequality aversion, the EDE represents the mean
health, and we see that the universal strategy offers
1000 more population QALYs compared to the tar-
geted strategy. For inequality aversion levels greater
than e = 8 and a = 0.12, the targeted strategy would
be preferred, implying that the decisionmaker would
be willing to sacrifice those 1000 population QALYs
to achieve the lower level of inequality.
Recent work on eliciting these inequality aversion
parameters from members of the general public in
England14 estimates anAtkinson eparameter of about
10.95 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 9.23–13.54) and
a Kolma parameter of about 0.15 (95%CI: 0.13–0.19).
Sensitivity Analysis
There are a number of sensitivity analyses we can
run to explore the impact of making alternative
assumptions in our modeling on our choice of pre-
ferred strategy. Tables 9 and 10 present the results,
respectively, of exploring 1) the impacts of alterna-
tive assumptions around the distribution of opportu-
nity costs, and 2) the impacts of alternative social
value judgments aboutwhich inequalities are consid-
ered unfair.
We could also perform additional sensitivity anal-
yses, including exploring alternative ways that the
reminder strategies might affect the different popula-
tion subgroups (e.g., having constant proportional
effects rather than constant absolute effects) and
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Figure 4 (A) Sensitivity to level of relative inequality aversion; and (B) sensitivity to level of absolute inequality aversion.
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testing for alternative underlying distributions of
CRC mortality, incidence, and severity.
DISCUSSION
DCEA is a framework for incorporating health
inequality concerns into the cost-effectiveness analy-
sis of health care interventions. It aims to help cost-
effectiveness analysts provide decision makers with
useful quantitative information about the health
inequality impacts of health care interventions, and
the nature and size of tradeoffs between the dual
objectives of improving total health and reducing
health inequality. It also aims to help cost-effective-
ness analysts accommodate different value judg-
ments about health inequality made by different
decision makers and stakeholders.
Social value judgments about health inequality are
complex, context dependent, and contestable. For
this reason, DCEA does not prescribe in advance
any particular set of social value judgments about
health inequality. A number of social value judg-
ments need to be made when implementing the
DCEA framework, in particular regarding which
dimensions of inequality are deemed unfair and the
nature and strength of inequality aversion. The
framework makes these social value judgments
explicit and transparent, and lends itself well to
checking the sensitivity of conclusions based on
alternative plausible social value judgments. DCEA
thus aims to provide decision makers with useful
quantitative information about health inequality
effects that can help to inform a deliberative deci-
sion-making process, by showing how different
social value judgments might lead to different con-
clusions. Empirical work to estimate the nature and
level of societal inequality aversion implicit in cur-
rent health care allocation decisions would be useful
in validating and complementing estimates of the
inequality aversion levels emerging from value
Table 10 Sensitivity to Alternative Social Value Judgments
Social Value Judgment Preferred Strategy Based on Social Welfare Index
IMD
Ethnic
Diversity Sex
Atkinson
EDE (e = 1)
Atkinson
EDE (e = 7)
Atkinson
EDE (e = 30)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.025)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.1)
Kolm
EDE (a = 0.5)
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T
EDE, equally distributed equivalent; IMD, index of multiple deprivation; T, targeted reminder; U, universal reminder.
Table 9 Sensitivity to Alternative Opportunity Cost Distributions
All Opportunity Cost Borne by Least Healthy Subgroup
All Opportunity Cost Borne
by Healthiest Subgroup
Social Welfare Indices
No
Screening Standard
Targeted
Reminder
Universal
Reminder
Targeted
Reminder
Universal
Reminder
Mean health 69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233* 69.30127 69.30233*
Atkinson EDE (e = 1) 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252* 69.18286 69.18373*
Atkinson EDE (e = 7) 68.33888 68.36800* 68.36610 68.36734 68.37799* 68.37769
Atkinson EDE (e = 30) 64.92865* 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892 64.95627* 64.95350
Kolm EDE (a = 0.025) 69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660* 69.09793 69.09866*
Kolm EDE (a = 0.1) 68.38168 68.41112* 68.40958 68.41074 68.42046* 68.42020
Kolm EDE (a = 0.5) 64.69578* 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532 64.72148* 64.71879
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
*The strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
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elicitation exercises conducted on members of the
general public in England.14 This work would be
analogous to the recent work that has been done to
generate empirical estimates of the cost-effectiveness
threshold.15
DCEA is intended to be a general and flexible ana-
lytical framework that allows a diverse range of spe-
cific methods and techniques to be applied at
different stages of the analysis. In particular, the eval-
uation stage can in principle use any kind of equity
weighting and/or multicriteria decision analysis to
analyze tradeoffs between improving total health
and reducing health inequality, and it is not
restricted to application of the specific Atkinson
and Kolm social welfare functions described in this
tutorial.
Wehave seen in this tutorial that DCEA is demand-
ing in terms of data, but feasible to implement in
a real-world context through creative application of
the standard tools of economic analysis. The data
and methods we have used are inevitably partial and
crude in many respects, and it is our hope that the
underpinning data and technical methods will be
improved and refined throughout the years. Although
the framework and methods involved may seem com-
plex, in our opinion this complexity is well within the
capabilities of analysts currently conducting standard
CEA.The key to expanding theuse ofDCEAwill be the
development of better methods for assisting decision
makers to clarify and quantify the nature of their
inequality concerns, and better ways of communicat-
ing findings to nonspecialist audiences.
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